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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-4056
___________
RAJESH ADHIKARI,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A087-567-743)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 10, 2013
Before: FISHER, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 11, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Rajesh Adhikari, a citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) decision denying his applications for relief from removal. We will deny

his petition for review. 1
We agree with the BIA that Adhikari failed to demonstrate “a requisite nexus”
between his claim and a statutory ground for asylum and withholding-of-removal relief.
See Administrative Record (A.R.) 3 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Under the REAL ID Act, which applies to Adhikari’s case, “the
applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting” him.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 142 n.4 (3d Cir.
2011). Adhikari claimed, but did not show, that he was targeted for robbery and
extortion based on his membership in a particular social group and his political opinion.
Assuming, without deciding, that Adhikari articulated a cognizable social group of
“substantial businessmen of means” under the statute, see Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen.,
527 F.3d 330, 345 n.10 (3d Cir. 2008), the record does not compel the conclusion that he
suffered mistreatment because of his membership in that group. Furthermore, although
Adhikari explained that his assailants identified themselves as members of the Young
Communist League and demanded money “from [his] business in order to develop” their

1

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), reviewing the BIA’s disposition, as well
as the Immigration Judge’s decision to the extent the BIA deferred to it. See Roye v.
Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). Agency determinations of fact are upheld
“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”
based on the evidentiary record. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); accord Garcia v. Att’y Gen.,
665 F.3d 496, 498 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011). Because we write primarily for the parties, we will
describe the facts only as they directly relate to our decision.
2

political organization, see A.R. 102–03, the assailants gave no indication that they were
singling him out on any protected basis, whether social or political. Cf. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (“The ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘persecution on
account of . . . political opinion’ in [8 U.S.C. § 1101](a)(42) is persecution on account of
the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s.”). Criminal activity and civil strife,
while unfortunate, do not always implicate a protected ground under the Act. 2 See, e.g.,
Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004). In short, the BIA did not err
in denying Adhikari’s asylum and withholding claims. 3
Adhikari also contends that the BIA applied the wrong standard in deciding his
Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim. We do not detect any infirmity in the BIA’s
CAT analysis; simply put, the record does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely
than not that Adhikari will be tortured if returned to Nepal. See Roye, 693 F.3d at 341.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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Although Adhikari contends that evidence in the record supports his claims, “[w]here
the record supports plausible but conflicting inferences in an immigration case, the
[agency’s] choice between those inferences is, a fortiori, supported by substantial
evidence.” Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 219 (1st Cir. 2007).

3

We do not think that the BIA held Adhikari “to an overly strict standard.” Pet’r Br. 25.
Extortion that is, in part, politically motivated or is designed to enrich a political entity
does not, under the reasoning of Elias-Zacarias, suffice to show that the targets of the
extortion were selected on political or social-group grounds. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S
at 482.
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